Weaver D A
Soc Secur Bull. 2001;64(1):1-15.
Widow benefits have been a part of the Social Security program since the 1939 amendments to the Social Security Act (widower benefits were added later). For many years, the Social Security law called for paying a widow(er) a fraction of the deceased worker's primary insurance amount (PIA). However, the worker--while alive--may have received the full PIA as his or her retirement benefit. Over time, arguments were made that a widow(er) should be treated as generously as his or her spouse was. The 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act allowed for a widow(er) to receive a full PIA, subject to actuarial reductions if the widow(er) benefit was claimed before the normal retirement age (NRA) and subject to a new provision of the law commonly referred to as the widow(er)'s limit. Generally, the widow(er)'s limit specifies that if a worker received reduced retirement benefits (because the worker claimed benefits before the NRA), then the worker's widow(er) cannot receive a monthly benefit equal to the full PIA. Rather, the widow(er)'s benefit is generally limited to the amount the worker would receive if he or she was still alive. The limit provision appears to be motivated by the overall intent of the 1972 Congress to pay a benefit to a widow(er) that was comparable with what the worker received. A number of changes to the limit provision have been discussed. This article looks at the following options: Abolishing the limit, Raising the limit by requiring that it never be set below the average PIA among all retired-worker beneficiaries. Adjusting the limit for some widow(er)s--that is, only persons who are widowed before the NRA (the ARLA option), Making a simpler adjustment to the limit by abolishing it for persons who are widowed before age 62 (the SARLA option), and A proposal by Robert J. Myers that would make modest adjustments to the limit for cases in which the worker died before the NRA. The most fundamental change--abolishing the limit--would increase benefits for about 2.8 million widow(er)s and would cost about $3.1 billion a year. Most of the additional government expenditures would not go to the poor and the near poor. Another change would be more successful in aiding low-income widow(er)s: requiring that the limit amount never be set below the average PIA among all retired-worker beneficiaries. About 58 percent of the government expenditures from that option would be received by the poor and the near poor. Overall, 1.2 million widow(er)s would be helped, and the cost would be about $816 million a year. Although the limit provision is consistent with the overall intent of the 1972 Congress, it can have effects that may have been unintended and that some policymakers might consider unusual. Persons who delay receipt of Social Security benefits usually receive higher monthly benefit amounts, but a widow(er) who faces a limit cannot increase his or her monthly benefit through delayed receipt of benefits. Thus, many persons who are widowed before the NRA face strong incentives to claim benefits early. That is somewhat unusual because the actuarial adjustments under Social Security are approximately fair, so there are no cost savings to the Social Security program from "forcing" a widow(er) to claim early benefits as opposed to allowing him or her to delay receipt of benefits in exchange for a higher monthly amount. And many widow(er)s would be better off if they could use the Social Security program to, in effect, save (that is, delay receipt of benefits in exchange for a higher amount later). This article analyzes two other options that would provide widow(er)s with additional filing options under Social Security. The ARLA option would ultimately help about 229,000 widow(er)s, and the cost would be small (about $69 million a year). The SARLA option would help about 117,000 widow(er)s, and the cost would be about $41 million a year. Robert J. Myers, a former Chief Actuary of Social Security, has offered a proposal that would provide relief from the widow(er)'s limit in cases in which the worker dies shortly after retirement. That proposal would help about 115,000 widow(er)s, and the cost would be low (about $57 million a year).
自1939年对《社会保障法》进行修订以来，遗属福利一直是社会保障计划的一部分（鳏夫福利后来才增加）。多年来，社会保障法规定向遗属支付已故工人原保险金额（PIA）的一定比例。然而，工人在世时可能已领取全额PIA作为其退休福利。随着时间的推移，有人认为遗属应得到与配偶同等慷慨的待遇。1972年对《社会保障法》的修订允许遗属领取全额PIA，但如果在正常退休年龄（NRA）之前申领遗属福利，则需进行精算削减，并受一项通常称为遗属限额的新法律条款限制。一般来说，遗属限额规定，如果工人领取的是减少的退休福利（因为工人在NRA之前申领福利），那么该工人的遗属每月领取的福利不能等于全额PIA。相反，遗属福利通常限于工人如果还活着会领取的金额。限额条款的出台似乎是受1972年国会的总体意图驱动，即向遗属支付与工人领取的福利相当的福利。人们讨论了对限额条款的一些修改。本文探讨了以下几种选择：取消限额；提高限额，要求其设定时永远不低于所有退休工人受益人的平均PIA；对某些遗属调整限额——即仅针对在NRA之前丧偶的人（提前退休遗属限额调整选项，ARLA）；通过取消对62岁之前丧偶者的限额来更简单地调整限额（62岁之前丧偶者简化调整选项，SARLA）；以及罗伯特·J·迈尔斯提出的一项建议，该建议将对工人在NRA之前去世的情况对限额进行适度调整。最根本的改变——取消限额——将使约280万遗属的福利增加，每年成本约为31亿美元。额外的政府支出大部分不会流向贫困和接近贫困的人群。另一项改变在帮助低收入遗属方面会更成功：要求限额金额设定时永远不低于所有退休工人受益人的平均PIA。该选项约58%的政府支出将由贫困和接近贫困的人群获得。总体而言，将帮助120万遗属，每年成本约为8.16亿美元。尽管限额条款与1972年国会的总体意图一致，但它可能产生一些意想不到的影响，一些政策制定者可能认为这些影响不寻常。延迟领取社会保障福利的人通常每月领取的福利金额更高，但面临限额的遗属无法通过延迟领取福利来增加其每月福利。因此，许多在NRA之前丧偶的人面临着提前申领福利的强烈动机。这有点不寻常，因为社会保障下的精算调整大致是公平的，所以与允许遗属延迟领取福利以换取更高的每月金额相比，“迫使”遗属提前申领福利对社会保障计划没有成本节省。而且，如果许多遗属能够利用社会保障计划进行储蓄（即延迟领取福利以换取以后更高的金额），他们的情况会更好。本文分析了另外两种选择，这两种选择将为遗属提供社会保障下的额外申领选项。ARLA选项最终将帮助约22.9万遗属，成本很小（每年约6900万美元）。SARLA选项将帮助约11.7万遗属，成本约为每年4100万美元。社会保障前首席精算师罗伯特·J·迈尔斯提出了一项建议，该建议将在工人退休后不久去世的情况下免除遗属限额。该建议将帮助约11.5万遗属，成本较低（每年约5700万美元）。
