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政策变量如何影响社会保障残疾保险申请的时机。

How policy variables influence the timing of applications for Social Security Disability Insurance.

作者信息

Burkhauser R V, Butler J S, Weathers R R

机构信息

Department of Policy Analysis and Management, Cornell University, USA.

出版信息

Soc Secur Bull. 2001;64(1):52-83.

PMID:12428518
Abstract

This article analyzes the impact of policy variables--employer accommodations, state Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) allowance rates, and DI benefits--on the timing of an application for DI benefits by workers with a work-limiting health condition starting when their health condition first begins to bother them. The analysis uses a rich mixture of personal and employer characteristics from the Health and Retirement Study linked to Social Security administrative records. We find that most workers do not apply immediately for DI benefits when they are first bothered by a health condition. On the contrary, the median working-age man with a work-limiting condition waits 7 years after that time before applying, and the median working-age woman waits 8 years. Although the risk of applying for benefits is greatest in the year following onset, only 16 percent of men and 13 percent of women in our sample apply within the first year, and the risk of application falls thereafter. That finding suggests that institutional factors, in addition to health factors, may play a role in the timing of DI applications. Using kernel density estimates of the distribution of application and nonapplication ordered by state allowance rates (the rate of acceptance per DI determination in each state), we find that both men and women who live in states with high allowance rates are disproportionately more likely to apply for benefits in the first year after their condition begins to bother them than are those in states with low allowance rates. Using life-table analysis, we also find that men and women who are accommodated by their employers are significantly less likely to apply for DI benefits in each of the first few years after their condition begins to bother them than are those who are not accommodated. On the basis of this evidence, we include these policy variables in a model of the timing of DI application that controls for other socioeconomic variables as well as health. Using a hazard model, we find that workers who live in states with higher allowance rates apply for DI benefits significantly sooner than those living in states with lower allowance rates following the onset of a work-limiting health condition. Workers who are accommodated following the onset of a work-limiting health condition, however, are significantly slower to apply for DI benefits. Using the mean values of all explanatory variables, we estimate the relative importance of changes in these policy variables on the speed with which workers apply for benefits after onset. We find that the mean time until application for men is 10.22 years. Universal accommodations following onset would delay application by 4.36 years. In contrast, a 20 percent decrease in state allowance rates would delay application by only 0.88 years. For working-age women, the average expected time until application once a condition begins to bother them is 10.58 years. Universal accommodations would delay that by 3.76 years, and a 20 percent decrease in allowance rates would delay it by 1.47 years. A complication in this analysis is that the policy variables are to some degree endogenous. Accommodation is probably offered more often to workers who want to continue working. Allowance rates are chosen by states on the basis of federal policy and local choices and probably in part on the health condition of workers in the state. Therefore, our estimates are upper bounds of these policy effects. Still, we believe we provide evidence that the social environment faced by workers with work-limiting health conditions can significantly influence their decision to apply for DI benefits, holding their specific health conditions constant.

摘要

本文分析了政策变量——雇主提供的便利条件、各州社会保障残疾保险(DI)津贴率以及DI福利——对患有影响工作的健康状况的工人申请DI福利时间的影响,这一时间从他们的健康状况首次开始给他们带来困扰时算起。该分析使用了来自健康与退休研究的丰富的个人和雇主特征数据,并与社会保障行政记录相联系。我们发现,大多数工人在首次受到健康状况困扰时并不会立即申请DI福利。相反,患有影响工作的健康状况的在职男性中位数在首次受到困扰后要等待7年才申请,在职女性中位数则要等待8年。尽管在发病后的第一年申请福利的风险最大,但在我们的样本中,只有16%的男性和13%的女性在第一年申请,此后申请风险下降。这一发现表明,除了健康因素外,制度因素可能在DI申请时间上也发挥了作用。通过使用按各州津贴率(每个州每次DI判定的接受率)排序的申请和未申请分布的核密度估计,我们发现,与津贴率低的州的男性和女性相比,生活在津贴率高的州的男性和女性在健康状况开始给他们带来困扰后的第一年申请福利的可能性要高得多。通过生命表分析,我们还发现,与未得到雇主提供便利条件的男性和女性相比,在健康状况开始给他们带来困扰后的头几年里,得到雇主提供便利条件的男性和女性申请DI福利的可能性显著更低。基于这些证据,我们将这些政策变量纳入一个DI申请时间模型,该模型控制了其他社会经济变量以及健康因素。使用风险模型,我们发现,患有影响工作的健康状况后,生活在津贴率较高州的工人比生活在津贴率较低州的工人申请DI福利的时间要早得多。然而,在患有影响工作的健康状况后得到雇主提供便利条件的工人申请DI福利的速度要慢得多。使用所有解释变量的均值,我们估计了这些政策变量的变化对工人发病后申请福利速度的相对重要性。我们发现,男性申请的平均时间为10.22年。发病后普遍提供便利条件会使申请延迟4.36年。相比之下,各州津贴率降低20%只会使申请延迟0.88年。对于在职女性来说,一旦健康状况开始给她们带来困扰,平均预期申请时间为10.58年。普遍提供便利条件会使这一时间延迟3.76年,津贴率降低20%会使它延迟1.47年。该分析中的一个复杂情况是,政策变量在某种程度上是内生的。雇主可能更经常地为那些想继续工作的工人提供便利条件。津贴率是各州根据联邦政策和地方选择确定的,可能部分还基于该州工人的健康状况。因此,我们的估计是这些政策效应的上限。不过,我们相信我们提供了证据,表明患有影响工作的健康状况工人所面临的社会环境在他们特定健康状况不变的情况下,会显著影响他们申请DI福利的决定。

相似文献

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Age and disability employment discrimination: occupational rehabilitation implications.年龄和残疾就业歧视:职业康复的影响。
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