van Baalen Minus, Jansen Vincent A A
Institut d'Ecologie, UMR 7625, Université Pierre et Marie Curie, Bât. A, 7ème Etage CC237, 7 quai St Bernard, 75252 Paris Cedex 05, France.
Proc Biol Sci. 2003 Jan 7;270(1510):69-76. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2002.2151.
We investigate how the evolution of communication strategies affects signal credibility when there is common interest as well as a conflict between communicating individuals. Taking alarm calls as an example, we show that if the temptation to cheat is low, a single signal is used in the population. If the temptation increases cheaters will erode the credibility of a signal, and an honest mutant using a different signal ('a private code') will be very successful until this, in turn, is cracked by cheaters. In such a system, signal use fluctuates in time and space and hence the meaning of a given signal is not constant. When the temptation to cheat is too large, no honest communication can maintain itself in a Tower of Babel of many signals. We discuss our analysis in the light of the Green Beard mechanism for the evolution of altruism.
我们研究了当交流个体之间存在共同利益以及冲突时，交流策略的演变如何影响信号的可信度。以警报叫声为例，我们表明，如果作弊的诱惑较低，群体中会使用单一信号。如果诱惑增加，作弊者会侵蚀信号的可信度，而使用不同信号（“私人代码”）的诚实突变体将非常成功，直到这个信号反过来被作弊者破解。在这样的系统中，信号的使用在时间和空间上波动，因此给定信号的含义并不恒定。当作弊的诱惑太大时，在众多信号的巴别塔中，没有诚实的交流会自我维持。我们根据利他主义进化的绿胡须机制来讨论我们的分析。
