Darrigol Olivier
CNRS, Paris, France.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2003 Sep;34(3):515-73. doi: 10.1016/s0039-3681(03)00043-8.
In 1887 Helmholtz discussed the foundations of measurement in science as a last contribution to his philosophy of knowledge. This essay borrowed from earlier debates on the foundations of mathematics (Grassmann/Du Bois), on the possibility of quantitative psychology (Fechner/Kries, Wundt/Zeller), and on the meaning of temperature measurement (Maxwell,Mach.). Late nineteenth-century scrutinisers of the foundations of mathematics (Dedekind, Cantor, Frege, Russell) made little of Helmholtz's essay. Yet it inspired two mathematicians with an eye on physics (Poincaré and Hölder), and a few philosopher-physicists (Mach, Duhem,Campbell). The aim of the present paper is to situate Helmholtz's contribution in this complex array of nineteenth-century philosophies of number, quantity, and measurement.
1887年,亥姆霍兹探讨了科学测量的基础,作为他对知识哲学的最后一项贡献。这篇文章借鉴了早期关于数学基础(格拉斯曼/杜布瓦)、定量心理学的可能性(费希纳/克里斯、冯特/策勒)以及温度测量的意义(麦克斯韦、马赫)的辩论。19世纪晚期对数学基础进行审视的学者(戴德金、康托尔、弗雷格、罗素)对亥姆霍兹的文章评价不高。然而,它启发了两位关注物理学的数学家(庞加莱和赫尔德),以及一些哲学家兼物理学家(马赫、迪昂、坎贝尔)。本文的目的是将亥姆霍兹的贡献置于19世纪关于数、量和测量的一系列复杂哲学之中。