De Kock Liesbet
Ghent University, Belgium.
Sci Context. 2014 Dec;27(4):709-44. doi: 10.1017/s026988971400026x.
This paper aims at contributing to the ongoing efforts to get a firmer grasp of the systematic significance of the entanglement of idealism and empiricism in Helmholtz's work. Contrary to existing analyses, however, the focal point of the present exposition is Helmholtz's attempt to articulate a psychological account of objectification. Helmholtz's motive, as well as his solution to the problem of the object are outlined, and interpreted against the background of his scientific practice on the one hand, and that of empiricist and (transcendental) idealist analyses of experience on the other. The specifically psychological angle taken, not only prompts us to consider figures who have hitherto been treated as having only minor import for Helmholtz interpretation (most importantly J.S. Mill and J.G. Fichte), it furthermore sheds new light on some central tenets of the latter's psychological stance that have hitherto remained underappreciated. For one thing, this analysis reveals an explicit voluntarist tendency in Helmholtz's psychological theory. In conclusion, it is argued that the systematic significance of Helmholtz's empirico-transcendentalism with respect to questions of the mind is best understood as an attempt to found his empirical theory of perception in a second order, normative account of epistemic subjectivity.
本文旨在推动当前的相关研究工作，以便更深入地理解唯心主义与经验主义在亥姆霍兹著作中的交织所具有的系统意义。然而，与现有分析不同的是，本论述的重点是亥姆霍兹试图阐明一种客观化的心理学解释。文中概述了亥姆霍兹的动机以及他对客体问题的解决方案，并一方面以他的科学实践为背景，另一方面以经验主义和（先验）唯心主义对经验的分析为背景进行解读。所采用的特定心理学视角，不仅促使我们去考量那些迄今在对亥姆霍兹的解读中被视为不太重要的人物（最重要的是约翰·斯图尔特·密尔和约翰·戈特利布·费希特），而且还为亥姆霍兹心理学立场的一些核心信条带来了新的解读，而这些信条迄今一直未得到充分重视。一方面，这种分析揭示了亥姆霍兹心理学理论中一种明确的唯意志论倾向。总之，有人认为，亥姆霍兹的经验 - 先验论在心智问题上的系统意义，最好理解为是他试图在关于认知主体性的二阶规范性解释中奠定其感知经验理论的基础。
