Nyman J A, Maude-Griffin R
Division of Health Services Research and Policy, University of Minnesota, USA.
Int J Health Care Finance Econ. 2001 Mar;1(1):23-42. doi: 10.1023/a:1011547904553.
Pauly's analysis of the welfare effects of moral hazard assumes that consumption of health care does not increase with income, however, empirical evidence suggests it does. For health insurance contracts that pay off by reducing price, the income effect is represented by the additional health care consumed because of income transfers from those who remain healthy to those who become ill. This implies a different decomposition of demand than the standard Hicksian decomposition. When the effect of income transfers is removed, the price-related welfare loss is smaller than either the loss suggested by Pauly's analysis or a Hicksian decomposition.
保利对道德风险的福利效应分析假定医疗保健消费不会随收入增加，然而，实证证据表明它会。对于通过降低价格来赔付的健康保险合同，收入效应表现为因从健康者向患病者的收入转移而额外消费的医疗保健。这意味着需求分解与标准的希克斯分解不同。当去除收入转移的影响时，与价格相关的福利损失比保利分析所表明的损失或希克斯分解的损失都要小。
