Manning W G, Newhouse J P, Duan N, Keeler E B, Leibowitz A, Marquis M S
Am Econ Rev. 1987 Jun;77(3):251-77.
We estimate how cost sharing, the portion of the bill the patient pays, affects the demand for medical services. The data come from a randomized experiment. A catastrophic insurance plan reduces expenditures 31 percent relative to zero out-of-pocket price. The price elasticity is approximately -0.2. We reject the hypothesis that less favorable coverage of outpatient services increases total expenditure (for example, by deterring preventive care or inducing hospitalization).
我们估计了费用分摊(即患者支付的账单比例)如何影响医疗服务需求。数据来自一项随机试验。与零自付价格相比,一项灾难性保险计划使支出降低了31%。价格弹性约为-0.2。我们拒绝这样的假设,即门诊服务的保险覆盖范围较差会增加总支出(例如,通过阻碍预防性护理或导致住院)。