Eikeland Sveinung, Eythorsson Einar, Ivanova Lyudmila
Research Director, Norut-Norwegian Institute of Urban and Regional Research (NIBR), Follumsveg, 9505, Alta, Norway.
Environ Manage. 2004 Mar;33(3):285-93. doi: 10.1007/s00267-004-0104-z. Epub 2004 Apr 19.
The local branches of the Russian Forestry Service, the leskhozy, were known for their efficiency and management skills in the Soviet era and were one of the very few community-based "Soviet-type" institutions to survive the transition. This article examines the role of the leskhozy in the new market economy. Our analysis is based on data from interviews with informants attached to the forestry sector in the Murmansk area. In some cases their knowledge of the leskhozy stretches back to the emergence of the system in 1947. Our principal finding is that the struggle to survive as a federal body in the current legal and economic climate is forcing the leskhozy to relegate sustainable forestry management, presumably their primary raison d'être, to the lower portions of their list of priorities. Several consequences result. There is a heightened incidence of illegal logging, and corruption informs the allocation of forest areas to private interests. Stumpage prices have plummeted as timber from subsidized commercial cutting (ostensibly sanitary cutting or thinning) has flooded the markets. The root cause of these tribulations lies with the market-based harvesting permit system. Its introduction in the 1990s did little to eliminate the self-seeking practices of the old Soviet forestry management hierarchies. In the free market, local forestry managers can turn their dual responsibilities to their own advantage inasmuch as they control the allocation of harvesting permits while at the same time controlling logging practices.
俄罗斯林业局的地方分支机构,即林场,在苏联时期以其高效和管理技能而闻名,并且是少数在转型中幸存下来的基于社区的“苏联式”机构之一。本文探讨了林场在新市场经济中的作用。我们的分析基于对摩尔曼斯克地区林业部门相关人士的访谈数据。在某些情况下,他们对林场的了解可以追溯到1947年该系统的出现。我们的主要发现是,在当前的法律和经济环境下,作为一个联邦机构努力生存的斗争正迫使林场将可持续森林管理(大概是其存在的主要理由)置于其优先事项清单的较低位置。这导致了几个后果。非法采伐的发生率增加,并且在将林区分配给私人利益方面存在腐败现象。由于来自补贴商业采伐(表面上是卫生采伐或间伐)的木材充斥市场,立木价格暴跌。这些困境的根源在于基于市场的采伐许可制度。它在20世纪90年代的引入几乎没有消除苏联旧林业管理层级的利己行为。在自由市场中,当地林业管理人员可以将他们的双重职责转化为自身优势,因为他们既控制采伐许可的分配,同时又控制采伐作业。