Svoboda Tomislav, Henry Bonnie, Shulman Leslie, Kennedy Erin, Rea Elizabeth, Ng Wil, Wallington Tamara, Yaffe Barbara, Gournis Effie, Vicencio Elisa, Basrur Sheela, Glazier Richard H
Inner City Health Research Unit, Toronto Public Health, Toronto, Canada.
N Engl J Med. 2004 Jun 3;350(23):2352-61. doi: 10.1056/NEJMoa032111.
Toronto was the site of North America's largest outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). An understanding of the patterns of transmission and the effects on public health in relation to control measures that were taken will help health officials prepare for any future outbreaks.
We analyzed SARS case, quarantine, and hotline records in relation to control measures. The two phases of the outbreak were compared.
Toronto Public Health investigated 2132 potential cases of SARS, identified 23,103 contacts of SARS patients as requiring quarantine, and logged 316,615 calls on its SARS hotline. In Toronto, 225 residents met the case definition of SARS, and all but 3 travel-related cases were linked to the index patient, from Hong Kong. SARS spread to 11 (58 percent) of Toronto's acute care hospitals. Unrecognized SARS among in-patients with underlying illness caused a resurgence, or a second phase, of the outbreak, which was finally controlled through active surveillance of hospitalized patients. In response to the control measures of Toronto Public Health, the number of persons who were exposed to SARS in nonhospital and nonhousehold settings dropped from 20 (13 percent) before the control measures were instituted (phase 1) to 0 afterward (phase 2). The number of patients who were exposed while in a hospital ward rose from 25 (17 percent) in phase 1 to 68 (88 percent) in phase 2, and the number exposed while in the intensive care unit dropped from 13 (9 percent) in phase 1 to 0 in phase 2. Community spread (the length of the chains of transmission outside of hospital settings) was significantly reduced in phase 2 of the outbreak (P<0.001).
The transmission of SARS in Toronto was limited primarily to hospitals and to households that had had contact with patients. For every case of SARS, health authorities should expect to quarantine up to 100 contacts of the patients and to investigate 8 possible cases. During an outbreak, active in-hospital surveillance for SARS-like illnesses and heightened infection-control measures are essential.
多伦多曾是北美严重急性呼吸综合征(SARS)疫情最严重的地区。了解疫情传播模式以及所采取的控制措施对公共卫生的影响,将有助于卫生官员为未来可能爆发的疫情做好准备。
我们结合控制措施分析了SARS病例、隔离及热线记录。对疫情的两个阶段进行了比较。
多伦多公共卫生部门调查了2132例潜在SARS病例,确定23103名SARS患者的接触者需要隔离,并在其SARS热线记录了316615个电话。在多伦多,225名居民符合SARS病例定义,除3例与旅行相关的病例外,所有病例均与来自香港的首例患者有关联。SARS传播至多伦多11家(58%)急症护理医院。患有基础疾病的住院患者中未被识别出的SARS导致了疫情的复发,即第二阶段,最终通过对住院患者的主动监测得以控制。针对多伦多公共卫生部门的控制措施,在非医院和非家庭环境中接触SARS的人数从控制措施实施前(第一阶段)的20人(13%)降至之后(第二阶段)的0人。在医院病房中接触SARS的患者人数从第一阶段的25人(17%)增至第二阶段的68人(88%),而在重症监护病房中接触SARS的患者人数从第一阶段的13人(9%)降至第二阶段的0人。疫情第二阶段社区传播(医院环境以外的传播链长度)显著减少(P<0.001)。
SARS在多伦多市的传播主要局限于医院以及与患者有接触的家庭。对于每一例SARS病例,卫生当局应预计需隔离多达100名患者的接触者,并调查8例可能的病例。在疫情爆发期间,对类似SARS疾病进行医院内主动监测以及加强感染控制措施至关重要。