Tanimoto Jun
Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka, Japan.
Biosystems. 2009 Apr;96(1):29-34. doi: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2008.11.004. Epub 2008 Nov 19.
In donor-recipient games (DRG), one of the sub-classes of Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), it is well-known that a game structure is described by two parameters benefit (b) and cost (c) of cooperation. By means of a series of numerical experiments, we proved that the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in DRG by various reciprocity mechanisms can be expressed in a single game structural parameter, b/c. This also implies that the dilemma strength in various donor-recipient games with various reciprocity mechanisms can be evaluated only by b/c, which is consistent with the previous novel finding by Nowak. It was also discussed whether this kind of parameterization idea can be extended to general games in PD game class.
在囚徒困境（PD）的子类之一——捐赠者 - 受赠者博弈（DRG）中，众所周知，博弈结构由合作的两个参数收益（b）和成本（c）来描述。通过一系列数值实验，我们证明了各种互惠机制在DRG中支持相互合作的有效性可以用单一的博弈结构参数b/c来表示。这也意味着，具有各种互惠机制的不同捐赠者 - 受赠者博弈中的困境强度仅通过b/c就可以评估，这与诺瓦克之前的新发现一致。还讨论了这种参数化思想是否可以扩展到PD博弈类中的一般博弈。
