West Marcus
J Anal Psychol. 2004 Sep;49(4):521-51. doi: 10.1111/j.0021-8774.2004.00482.x.
This paper describes the course of an analysis which demonstrates how borderline and narcissistic functioning can be understood in terms of a struggle with issues of identity. It shows how such functioning can come to exert a profound hold on the individual and why it seems, at times, a matter of life and death to the patient to avoid states of separation from the analyst. The paper suggests that these complex phenomena can be understood, perhaps surprisingly, in the simple terms of the nature of affect itself. The concept of the emotional core is introduced to embody and highlight that which lies beneath both Jungian and Freudian models (offering a potential bridge between the two models)--namely the psyche's essentially affective nature. It is suggested that the emotional core can serve as an organ of perception giving the individual both their primary relation to reality and an emotional attachment to others. This emotional core is understood to function in a narcissistic manner to preference experiences of sameness and in aversion to experiences of difference--a view consonant with Stern's understanding of infant development where the infant is able to distinguish self from other from the beginning of life (as Fordham also held); taking up Stern's terminology, it gives the individual a 'core' sense of being. There is, however, no stable, on-going sense of 'I' associated with this form of functioning as the individual is immersed in the latest affect to enter consciousness (as in the borderline state of mind) and consequently the individual comes to rely intensely on the other to determine their sense of being (the other becomes a self-regulating other in Stern's terms). The development of ego-functioning gives a more stable and on-going sense of 'I' to the individual, giving contact with the broader personality, allowing the individual to be less reliant on the other and orientating them to reality in a way more fitting to their overall needs. The paper describes how consciousness, which is not seen as identical with the ego, moves between the mode of functioning of the ego and that of the emotional core, i.e., shifting in and out of states where projective identification predominates. It elaborates the range of self-experience encompassing spiritual experience and states of disintegration (which are understood to have a similar structure) on one side, to ego-based experience (which can itself be defensive and rigid at times) on the other. It explores the consequences of such a view for analytic technique and relates it to the Jungian view of the self and the Freudian unconscious.
本文描述了一项分析的过程,该分析展示了边缘型和自恋型功能如何能从与身份认同问题的斗争角度来理解。它说明了这种功能如何能对个体产生深远影响,以及为何对患者来说,有时避免与分析师分离的状态似乎关乎生死。本文提出,这些复杂现象或许令人惊讶地能用情感本身的本质这一简单概念来理解。引入了情感核心的概念,以体现并突出荣格模型和弗洛伊德模型之下的东西(为这两种模型之间提供了潜在桥梁)——即心灵本质上的情感本质。有人认为,情感核心可作为一种感知器官,赋予个体与现实的主要关系以及对他人的情感依恋。这种情感核心被理解为以自恋的方式运作,偏好相同的体验,厌恶不同的体验——这一观点与斯特恩对婴儿发展的理解一致,即婴儿从生命伊始就能区分自我与他人(福特汉姆也持有此观点);采用斯特恩的术语,它赋予个体一种“核心”的存在感。然而,与这种功能形式相关的并没有稳定、持续的“我”的感觉,因为个体沉浸于进入意识的最新情感中(如在边缘型心理状态中),因此个体强烈依赖他人来确定自己的存在感(用斯特恩的话说,他人成为自我调节的他人)。自我功能的发展赋予个体更稳定、持续的“我”的感觉,使其与更广泛的人格建立联系,让个体减少对他人的依赖,并以更符合其整体需求的方式使其适应现实。本文描述了不被视为与自我相同的意识如何在自我功能和情感核心的运作模式之间转换,即在投射性认同占主导的状态之间进进出出。它阐述了自我体验的范围,一方面涵盖精神体验和瓦解状态(被理解为具有相似结构),另一方面涵盖基于自我的体验(这种体验有时本身可能具有防御性和僵化性)。它探讨了这种观点对分析技术的影响,并将其与荣格的自我观和弗洛伊德的无意识观联系起来。