Zick Cathleen D, Mathews Charles J, Roberts J Scott, Cook-Deegan Robert, Pokorski Robert J, Green Robert C
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA.
Health Aff (Millwood). 2005 Mar-Apr;24(2):483-90. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.24.2.483.
New genetic tests for adult-onset diseases raise concerns about possible adverse selection in insurance markets. To test for this behavior, we followed 148 cognitively normal people participating in a randomized clinical trial of genetic testing for Alzheimer's disease for one year after risk assessment and Apolipoprotein E (APOE) genotype disclosure. Although no significant differences were found in health, life, or disability insurance purchases, those who tested positive were 5.76 times more likely to have altered their long-term care insurance than those who did not receive APOE genotype disclosure. If genetic testing for Alzheimer's risk assessment becomes common, it could trigger adverse selection in long-term care insurance.
针对成人发病疾病的新型基因检测引发了人们对保险市场中可能出现的逆向选择的担忧。为了测试这种行为,我们追踪了148名认知正常的人,他们参与了一项针对阿尔茨海默病基因检测的随机临床试验,在风险评估和载脂蛋白E(APOE)基因型披露后的一年时间里对他们进行观察。尽管在健康保险、人寿保险或残疾保险的购买方面未发现显著差异,但检测呈阳性的人改变其长期护理保险的可能性是那些未获得APOE基因型披露的人的5.76倍。如果用于阿尔茨海默病风险评估的基因检测变得普遍,可能会引发长期护理保险中的逆向选择。