Fowler James H
Department of Political Science, University of California, 1 Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616, USA.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2005 May 10;102(19):7047-9. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0500938102. Epub 2005 Apr 27.
How did human cooperation evolve? Recent evidence shows that many people are willing to engage in altruistic punishment, voluntarily paying a cost to punish noncooperators. Although this behavior helps to explain how cooperation can persist, it creates an important puzzle. If altruistic punishment provides benefits to nonpunishers and is costly to punishers, then how could it evolve? Drawing on recent insights from voluntary public goods games, I present a simple evolutionary model in which altruistic punishers can enter and will always come to dominate a population of contributors, defectors, and nonparticipants. The model suggests that the cycle of strategies in voluntary public goods games does not persist in the presence of punishment strategies. It also suggests that punishment can only enforce payoff-improving strategies, contrary to a widely cited "folk theorem" result that suggests that punishment can allow the evolution of any strategy.
人类合作是如何演变的？最近的证据表明，许多人愿意进行利他惩罚，即自愿付出代价来惩罚不合作者。尽管这种行为有助于解释合作如何持续存在，但它也带来了一个重要的谜题。如果利他惩罚给不惩罚者带来好处，而对惩罚者来说成本高昂，那么它是如何进化的呢？借鉴自愿公共品博弈的最新见解，我提出了一个简单的进化模型，在这个模型中，利他惩罚者能够进入并总是会在贡献者、背叛者和不参与者群体中占据主导地位。该模型表明，在存在惩罚策略的情况下，自愿公共品博弈中的策略循环不会持续。它还表明，惩罚只能强化提高收益的策略，这与一个被广泛引用的“民间定理”结果相反，该结果表明惩罚可以允许任何策略的进化。
