Becchio Cristina, Adenzato Mauro, Bara Bruno G
Center for Cognitive Science, Department of Psychology, University of Turin, Turin, Italy.
Conscious Cogn. 2006 Mar;15(1):64-74. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2005.03.006. Epub 2005 Jun 2.
In this paper we present theoretical and experimental evidence for a set of mechanisms by which intention is understood. We propose that three basic aspects are involved in the understanding of intention. The first aspect to consider is intention recognition, i.e., the process by which we recognize other people's intentions, distinguishing among different types. The second aspect concerns the attribution of intention to its author: the existence of shared neural representations provides a parsimonious explanation of how we recognize other people's intentions (what they are doing), but in and of itself, is not sufficient to determine who the agent is. Once the intention has been recognized and attributed to an agent, the reasons for, and the aim of, the intention are to be considered. Hence, the third aspect concerns the aim-intention motivating the execution of a certain action. We discuss the neural basis of these three theoretical aspects suggesting a conceptual synthesis.
在本文中，我们提供了一系列关于意图理解机制的理论和实验证据。我们提出，意图理解涉及三个基本方面。首先要考虑的是意图识别，即我们识别他人意图并区分不同类型意图的过程。第二个方面涉及意图归属于其发出者：共享神经表征的存在为我们如何识别他人意图（他们在做什么）提供了一个简洁的解释，但就其本身而言，并不足以确定行为主体是谁。一旦意图被识别并归属于某个行为主体，就需要考虑意图的原因和目的。因此，第三个方面涉及促使执行特定行动的目标意图。我们讨论了这三个理论方面的神经基础，并提出了一种概念性的综合。
