Jacob Pierre
Département d'études Cognitives, Institut Jean Nicod, UMR 8129, EHESS/ENS, CNRS, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Pavillon Jardin, Paris, France.
Conscious Cogn. 2009 Mar;18(1):229-43. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.05.002. Epub 2008 Jun 25.
The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified by the activity of MNs, constitute instances of third-person mindreading, whereby an observer represents the agent's intention. (4) Non-motor mirroring processes enable humans to represent others' emotions. After questioning all four assumptions, I point out that MNs in an observer's brain could not synchronically resonate with MNs in an agent's brain unless they discharged in a single brain in two distinct tasks at different times. Finally, I sketch a conceptualist alternative to the resonance model according to which a brain mechanism active in both the execution and the perception of e.g., the act of grasping is the neural basis of the concept of e.g., grasping.
基于在猴子腹侧运动前皮层中发现镜像神经元（MNs）的人类社会认知的音叉模型，涉及以下四个假设：（1）镜像过程是共振或模拟过程。（2）它们可以是运动性的或非运动性的。（3）以MNs的活动为例的运动镜像（或动作镜像）过程构成了第三人称心理解读的实例，即观察者表征主体的意图。（4）非运动镜像过程使人类能够表征他人的情绪。在对所有四个假设提出质疑后，我指出观察者大脑中的MNs不可能与主体大脑中的MNs同步共振，除非它们在不同时间的两个不同任务中在单个大脑中放电。最后，我勾勒出一个与共振模型不同的概念主义替代方案，根据该方案，在例如抓握行为的执行和感知中都活跃的大脑机制是例如抓握概念的神经基础。
