Knobe Joshua
Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA.
Trends Cogn Sci. 2005 Aug;9(8):357-9. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2005.06.011.
It is widely recognized that people sometimes use theory-of-mind judgments in moral cognition. A series of recent studies shows that the connection can also work in the opposite direction: moral judgments can sometimes be used in theory-of-mind cognition. Thus, there appear to be cases in which people's moral judgments actually serve as input to the process underlying their application of theory-of-mind concepts.
人们有时会在道德认知中运用心理理论判断，这一点已得到广泛认可。最近的一系列研究表明，这种联系也可能反向起作用：道德判断有时也会用于心理理论认知。因此，似乎存在这样的情况，即人们的道德判断实际上会作为输入，作用于其运用心理理论概念的潜在过程。
