Gershman Samuel J, Gerstenberg Tobias, Baker Chris L, Cushman Fiery A
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, United States of America.
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States of America.
PLoS One. 2016 Sep 1;11(9):e0162246. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0162246. eCollection 2016.
Human success and even survival depends on our ability to predict what others will do by guessing what they are thinking. If I accelerate, will he yield? If I propose, will she accept? If I confess, will they forgive? Psychologists call this capacity "theory of mind." According to current theories, we solve this problem by assuming that others are rational actors. That is, we assume that others design and execute efficient plans to achieve their goals, given their knowledge. But if this view is correct, then our theory of mind is startlingly incomplete. Human action is not always a product of rational planning, and we would be mistaken to always interpret others' behaviors as such. A wealth of evidence indicates that we often act habitually-a form of behavioral control that depends not on rational planning, but rather on a history of reinforcement. We aim to test whether the human theory of mind includes a theory of habitual action and to assess when and how it is deployed. In a series of studies, we show that human theory of mind is sensitive to factors influencing the balance between habitual and planned behavior.
人类的成功乃至生存取决于我们通过猜测他人的想法来预测其行为的能力。如果我加速，他会让步吗？如果我求婚，她会答应吗？如果我坦白，他们会原谅我吗？心理学家将这种能力称为“心理理论”。根据当前的理论，我们通过假设他人是理性行为者来解决这个问题。也就是说，我们假设他人会根据自己的知识设计并执行有效的计划以实现目标。但如果这种观点是正确的，那么我们的心理理论就惊人地不完整。人类行为并不总是理性规划的产物，我们若总是将他人的行为如此解读就会犯错。大量证据表明，我们常常习惯性地行动——这是一种行为控制形式，它不依赖于理性规划，而是依赖于强化的历史。我们旨在测试人类的心理理论是否包括一种关于习惯性行动的理论，并评估它何时以及如何被运用。在一系列研究中，我们表明人类的心理理论对影响习惯性行为和计划性行为之间平衡的因素很敏感。
