Tickner Joel, Gouveia-Vigeant Tami
Lowell Center for Sustainable Production, University of Massachusetts-Lowell, Lowell, MA, USA.
Risk Anal. 2005 Jun;25(3):495-502. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2005.00617.x.
The precautionary principle calls on decisionmakers to take preventive action in light of evidence indicating that there is a potential for harm to public health and the environment, even though the nature and magnitude of harm are not fully understood scientifically. Critics of the precautionary principle frequently argue that unbridled application of the principle leads to unintended damage to health and ecosystems (risk tradeoffs) and that precautious decision making leaves us vulnerable to "false-positive" risks that divert resources away from "real risks." The 1991 cholera epidemic in Peru is often cited as an example of these pitfalls of the precautionary principle. It has been mistakenly argued that application of the precautionary principle caused decisionmakers to stop chlorinating the water supply due to the risks of disinfection byproducts (DBPs), resulting in the epidemic. Through analyses of investigations conducted in the cities of Iquitos and Trujillo, Peru, literature review, and interviews with leading Peruvian infectious disease researchers, we determined that the epidemic was caused by a much more complex set of circumstances, including poor sanitation conditions, poor separation of water and waste streams, and inadequate water treatment and distribution systems. The evidence indicates that no decision was made to stop chlorinating on the basis of DBP concerns and that concerns raised about DBPs masked more important factors limiting expansion of chlorination. In fact, outside of Peru's capital Lima, chlorination of drinking water supplies at the time of the epidemic was limited at best. We conclude that the Peruvian cholera epidemic was not caused by a failure of precaution but rather by an inadequate public health infrastructure unable to control a known risk: that of microbial contamination of water supplies.
预防原则要求决策者根据表明对公众健康和环境存在潜在危害的证据采取预防行动,即使危害的性质和程度尚未得到科学上的充分理解。预防原则的批评者经常争辩说,不加节制地应用该原则会对健康和生态系统造成意外损害(风险权衡),并且谨慎的决策使我们容易受到“假阳性”风险的影响,这些风险会使资源从“真正的风险”中转移出来。1991年秘鲁的霍乱疫情常被引为预防原则这些缺陷的一个例子。有人错误地认为,由于消毒副产物(DBPs)的风险,应用预防原则导致决策者停止对供水进行氯化处理,从而引发了疫情。通过对秘鲁伊基托斯和特鲁希略市进行的调查分析、文献综述以及对秘鲁主要传染病研究人员的访谈,我们确定疫情是由一系列更为复杂的情况引起的,包括卫生条件差、水和废物流分离不当以及水处理和分配系统不足。证据表明,没有基于对消毒副产物的担忧而做出停止氯化处理的决定,而且对消毒副产物的担忧掩盖了限制氯化处理扩展的更重要因素。事实上,在秘鲁首都利马以外地区,疫情发生时饮用水供应的氯化处理充其量是有限的。我们得出结论,秘鲁的霍乱疫情不是由预防失败造成的,而是由无法控制已知风险(即供水的微生物污染风险)的公共卫生基础设施不足所致。