Lipton Peter
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, UK.
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2005 Jun 29;360(1458):1259-69. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2005.1660.
The attitudes of scientists towards the philosophy of science is mixed and includes considerable indifference and some hostility. This may be due in part to unrealistic expectation and to misunderstanding. Philosophy is unlikely directly to improve scientific practices, but scientists may find the attempt to explain how science works and what it achieves of considerable interest nevertheless. The present state of the philosophy of science is illustrated by recent work on the 'truth hypothesis', according to which, science is generating increasingly accurate representations of a mind-independent and largely unobservable world. According to Karl Popper, although truth is the aim of science, it is impossible to justify the truth hypothesis. According to Thomas Kuhn, the truth hypothesis is false, because scientists can only describe a world that is partially constituted by their own theories and hence not mind-independent. The failure of past scientific theories has been used to argue against the truth hypothesis; the success of the best current theories has been used to argue for it. Neither argument is sound.
科学家们对科学哲学的态度不一,其中包括相当程度的漠不关心和一些敌意。这在一定程度上可能是由于不切实际的期望和误解。哲学不太可能直接改进科学实践,但科学家们可能会发现,尝试解释科学如何运作以及它取得了什么成果仍然饶有趣味。科学哲学的现状可以通过近期关于“真理假设”的研究来说明,根据这一假设,科学正在生成对一个独立于心灵且大多不可观察的世界越来越准确的表征。按照卡尔·波普尔的观点,虽然真理是科学的目标,但无法为真理假设提供正当理由。按照托马斯·库恩的观点,真理假设是错误的,因为科学家只能描述一个部分由他们自己的理论构成的世界,因此并非独立于心灵。过去科学理论的失败被用来反对真理假设;当前最佳理论的成功则被用来支持它。这两种论点都站不住脚。