Notturno M A
Psychol Med. 1984 May;14(2):273-89. doi: 10.1017/s003329170000355x.
This paper argues: (1) that analysis of the issues upon which Popper and Kuhn have been thought to differ - the possibility of conclusive falsification, the incommensurability of theories, and the existence of normal science - reveals no appreciable difference at all; (2) that the basic point of disagreement concerns the role of truth in scientific inquiry, i.e. whether or not truth should be considered the regulative ideal of science; (3) that confusion concerning these issues results from a paradigm shift in epistemology; and (4) that Popper's epistemology proves more attractive than Kuhn's for unification in psychology.
（1）对波普尔和库恩被认为存在分歧的问题——决定性证伪的可能性、理论的不可通约性以及常规科学的存在——的分析表明根本不存在明显差异；（2）分歧的基本点在于真理在科学探究中的作用，即真理是否应被视为科学的规范性理想；（3）对这些问题的混淆源于认识论中的范式转变；（4）在心理学的统一方面，波普尔的认识论比库恩的更具吸引力。
