Bostrom Nick
Oxford University, Faculty of Philosophy, 10 Merton Street, Oxford, OX1 4JJ, UK.
Bioethics. 2005 Jun;19(3):202-14. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2005.00437.x.
Positions on the ethics of human enhancement technologies can be (crudely) characterized as ranging from transhumanism to bioconservatism. Transhumanists believe that human enhancement technologies should be made widely available, that individuals should have broad discretion over which of these technologies to apply to themselves, and that parents should normally have the right to choose enhancements for their children-to-be. Bioconservatives (whose ranks include such diverse writers as Leon Kass, Francis Fukuyama, George Annas, Wesley Smith, Jeremy Rifkin, and Bill McKibben) are generally opposed to the use of technology to modify human nature. A central idea in bioconservativism is that human enhancement technologies will undermine our human dignity. To forestall a slide down the slippery slope towards an ultimately debased 'posthuman' state, bioconservatives often argue for broad bans on otherwise promising human enhancements. This paper distinguishes two common fears about the posthuman and argues for the importance of a concept of dignity that is inclusive enough to also apply to many possible posthuman beings. Recognizing the possibility of posthuman dignity undercuts an important objection against human enhancement and removes a distortive double standard from our field of moral vision.
关于人类增强技术的伦理立场(大致)可被描述为从超人类主义到生物保守主义。超人类主义者认为,人类增强技术应广泛可得,个人应对将哪些技术应用于自身拥有广泛的决定权,并且父母通常应有权为其未来的子女选择增强手段。生物保守主义者(其阵营包括莱昂·卡斯、弗朗西斯·福山、乔治·安纳斯、韦斯利·史密斯、杰里米·里夫金和比尔·麦基本等不同的作家)通常反对使用技术来改变人性。生物保守主义的一个核心观点是,人类增强技术将损害我们的人类尊严。为防止滑向最终堕落的“后人类”状态的滑坡,生物保守主义者常常主张广泛禁止其他方面有前景的人类增强手段。本文区分了对后人类的两种常见担忧,并论证了一种足够包容、也适用于许多可能的后人类存在的尊严概念的重要性。认识到后人类尊严的可能性削弱了对人类增强的一个重要反对理由,并从我们的道德视野领域消除了一种扭曲的双重标准。