Kraus B, Gisin N, Renner R
Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, CH-Geneve, Switzerland.
Phys Rev Lett. 2005 Aug 19;95(8):080501. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.95.080501. Epub 2005 Aug 15.
We investigate a general class of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols using one-way classical communication. We show that full security can be proven by considering only collective attacks. We derive computable lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate of those QKD protocols involving only entropies of two-qubit density operators. As an illustration of our results, we determine new bounds for the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the 6-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols. We show that in all these cases the first classical processing that the legitimate partners should apply consists in adding noise.
我们研究了一类使用单向经典通信的量子密钥分发（QKD）协议。我们表明，仅考虑集体攻击就可以证明完全安全性。我们推导了那些仅涉及两量子比特密度算子熵的QKD协议的密钥率的可计算上下界。作为我们结果的一个例证，我们确定了1984年贝内特 - 布拉萨德协议、六态协议和1992年贝内特协议的新界。我们表明，在所有这些情况下，合法伙伴应应用的第一个经典处理在于添加噪声。
