Urban Elizabeth
J Anal Psychol. 2005 Nov;50(5):571-94. doi: 10.1111/j.0021-8774.2005.00559.x.
This paper is about Fordham's contribution to Jung's studies on the self. It opens with the epistemological dilemmas inherent in the subject, before moving on to an account of Fordham's research into the incompatible ways Jung used the term 'self'. There is a description of Fordham's model, which covers his concepts of the primary self, deintegration, reintegration, self objects, self representations, and individuation in infancy. There is a section which discusses areas in which Fordham apparently diverged from Jung, including how these were reconciled by Fordham's developmental approach. These areas include the definition of the self as totality or archetype, the mind-body relationship, the 'ultimate', the origins of the archetypes, and the primary self, the self and the sense of self. It concludes with an extension to Fordham's outline of a resolution to Jung's incompatible definitions. This draws upon the concept of the central archetype of order and how its unfolding is evidenced towards the end of the first year of infancy.
本文探讨了福特汉姆对荣格自我研究的贡献。开篇阐述了该主题所固有的认识论困境,接着讲述了福特汉姆对荣格使用“自我”一词的不相容方式的研究。文中描述了福特汉姆的模型,涵盖了他关于原初自我、去整合、再整合、自我客体、自我表征以及婴儿期个体化的概念。有一部分内容讨论了福特汉姆明显与荣格不同的领域,包括福特汉姆的发展方法是如何调和这些差异的。这些领域包括将自我定义为整体或原型、身心关系、“终极”、原型的起源、原初自我、自我与自我意识。文章最后扩展了福特汉姆对荣格不相容定义的一种解决方案的概述。这借鉴了秩序中心原型的概念以及在婴儿期第一年接近尾声时其展开的证据。