Lesley Joan
Sebbelows Stiftelse Family Center, Oslo, Norway.
Conscious Cogn. 2006 Sep;15(3):593-604. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2005.11.006. Epub 2006 Jan 26.
This essay discusses how the organisation of mental material within the cognitive system can influence consciousness and awareness, and presents a theory of dissociation based on the premise that awareness is relative, contingent on the activated representation of the ongoing event being linked to the activated self-representation. It allows four possible variations of integration: (i) non-integrated experience--perceptions about an object/event are either not perceived or they remain at the sensory level: traditional dissociative states, amnesia, depersonalisation etc; (ii) variably integrated experience--activation of information of a specific valence about an object blocks activation of information of contrasting valence: splitting; (iii) alternatively integrated experience--experience is integrated into a specific, limited active self-representation: fugue and multiple identity states; (iv) dis-integrated experience-the ongoing experience of innate drives and needs is no longer consistently activated in the core self-representation: repression and isolation.
本文探讨了认知系统中心理材料的组织方式如何影响意识和觉知，并提出了一种解离理论，其前提是觉知是相对的，取决于正在进行的事件的激活表征与激活的自我表征之间的联系。它允许四种可能的整合变体：（i）非整合体验——对一个物体/事件的感知要么未被察觉，要么停留在感觉层面：传统的解离状态、失忆、人格解体等；（ii）可变整合体验——关于一个物体的特定效价信息的激活会阻止相反效价信息的激活：分裂；（iii）交替整合体验——体验被整合到一个特定的、有限的活跃自我表征中：神游症和多重身份状态；（iv）去整合体验——先天驱力和需求的持续体验不再在核心自我表征中持续被激活：压抑和隔离。
