Moses Sandra N, Villate Christina, Ryan Jennifer D
Rotman Research Institute, Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care, Toronto, Canada.
Neuropsychologia. 2006;44(8):1370-87. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.01.004. Epub 2006 Feb 28.
Generalizations about neural function are often drawn from non-human animal models to human cognition, however, the assumption of cross-species conservation may sometimes be invalid. Humans may use different strategies mediated by alternative structures, or similar structures may operate differently within the context of the human brain. The transitive inference problem, considered a hallmark of logical reasoning, can be solved by non-human species via associative learning rather than logic. We tested whether humans use similar strategies to other species for transitive inference. Results are crucial for evaluating the validity of widely accepted assumptions of similar neural substrates underlying performance in humans and other animals. Here we show that successful transitive inference in humans is unrelated to use of associative learning strategies and is associated with ability to report the hierarchical relationship among stimuli. Our work stipulates that cross-species generalizations must be interpreted cautiously, since performance on the same task may be mediated by different strategies and/or neural systems.
关于神经功能的概括通常是从非人类动物模型推导至人类认知的，然而，跨物种保守性的假设有时可能并不成立。人类可能会使用由其他结构介导的不同策略，或者相似的结构在人类大脑的背景下可能会有不同的运作方式。传递性推理问题被认为是逻辑推理的一个标志，非人类物种可以通过联想学习而非逻辑来解决这个问题。我们测试了人类在传递性推理中是否使用与其他物种相似的策略。研究结果对于评估被广泛接受的关于人类和其他动物表现背后存在相似神经底物这一假设的有效性至关重要。在这里，我们表明人类成功的传递性推理与联想学习策略的使用无关，而是与报告刺激之间层次关系的能力相关。我们的研究表明，跨物种的概括必须谨慎解读，因为同一任务的表现可能由不同的策略和/或神经系统介导。
