Dawson A, Garrard E
Centre for Professional Ethics, Keele Hall, Keele University, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, UK.
J Med Ethics. 2006 Apr;32(4):200-4. doi: 10.1136/jme.2005.012591.
Raanan Gillon is a noted defender of the four principles approach to healthcare ethics. His general position has always been that these principles are to be considered to be both universal and prima facie in nature. In recent work, however, he has made two claims that seem to present difficulties for this view. His first claim is that one of these four principles, respect for autonomy, has a special position in relation to the others: he holds that it is first among equals. We argue that this claim makes little sense if the principles are to retain their prima facie nature. His second claim is that cultural variation can play an independent normative role in the construction of our moral judgments. This, he argues, enables us to occupy a middle ground between what he sees as the twin pitfalls of moral relativism and (what he calls) moral imperialism. We argue that there is no such middle ground, and while Gillon ultimately seems committed to relativism, it is some form of moral imperialism (in the form of moral objectivism) that will provide the only satisfactory construal of the four principles as prima facie universal moral principles.
拉阿南·吉利翁是医疗保健伦理四原则方法的著名捍卫者。他的总体立场一直是,这些原则在本质上应被视为既具有普遍性又是显见的。然而,在最近的著作中,他提出了两个主张,这两个主张似乎给这种观点带来了困难。他的第一个主张是,这四项原则中的一项,即尊重自主性,相对于其他原则具有特殊地位:他认为它在同等重要的原则中处于首要位置。我们认为,如果这些原则要保持其显见的性质,这一主张就没什么意义。他的第二个主张是,文化差异在我们道德判断的构建中可以发挥独立的规范作用。他认为,这使我们能够在他所认为的道德相对主义和(他所称的)道德帝国主义这两个双重陷阱之间占据一个中间立场。我们认为不存在这样的中间立场,而且虽然吉利翁最终似乎倾向于相对主义,但将这四项原则视为显见的普遍道德原则的唯一令人满意的解释将是某种形式的道德帝国主义(以道德客观主义的形式)。