Collins Darrell J, Shanks David R
School of Psychology, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia.
Q J Exp Psychol (Hove). 2006 Feb;59(2):225-32. doi: 10.1080/17470210500370457.
P. W. Cheng's (1997) power PC theory of causal induction proposes that causal estimates are based on the power (P) of a potential cause, where P is the contingency between the cause and effect normalized by the base rate of the effect. Most previous research using a standard causal probe question has failed to support the predictions of the power PC model but recently Buehner, Cheng, and Clifford (2003) found that participants responded in terms of causal power when probed with a counterfactual test question, which they argued prompted participants to consider the base rate of the effect. However, Buehner et al. framed their counterfactual question in terms of frequency, a factor that has been demonstrated to decrease base rate neglect in judgements under uncertainty. In the experiment reported here, we sought to disentangle the influence of counterfactual and frequency framing of the probe question to determine which factor is responsible for encouraging responses in terms of causal power.
P. W. 程(1997年)的因果归纳力PC理论提出,因果估计基于潜在原因的效力(P),其中P是原因与结果之间的相依性,并通过结果的基率进行标准化。以前大多数使用标准因果探测问题的研究都未能支持效力PC模型的预测,但最近比埃纳、程和克利福德(2003年)发现,当用反事实测试问题进行探测时,参与者会根据因果效力做出反应,他们认为这促使参与者考虑结果的基率。然而,比埃纳等人将他们的反事实问题用频率来表述,这是一个已被证明能减少不确定性判断中对基率忽视的因素。在本文所报告的实验中,我们试图厘清探测问题的反事实和频率表述方式的影响,以确定是哪个因素促使了基于因果效力的反应。