Perales José C, Shanks David R
Departamento de Psicología Experimental y Fisiología del Comportamiento, Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain.
J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn. 2008 Nov;34(6):1482-94. doi: 10.1037/a0013509.
It has been proposed that causal power (defined as the probability with which a candidate cause would produce an effect in the absence of any other background causes) can be intuitively computed from cause-effect covariation information. Estimation of power is assumed to require a special type of counterfactual probe question, worded to remove potential sources of ambiguity. The present study analyzes the adequacy of such questions to evoke normative causal power estimation. The authors report that judgments to counterfactual probes do not conform to causal power and that they strongly depend on both the probe question wording and the way that covariation information is presented. The data are parsimoniously accounted for by an alternative model of causal judgment, the Evidence Integration rule.
有人提出，因果力（定义为在没有任何其他背景原因的情况下，候选原因产生某种效应的概率）可以根据因果共变信息直观地计算出来。人们认为，对因果力的估计需要一种特殊类型的反事实探测问题，其措辞应消除潜在的歧义来源。本研究分析了此类问题在引发规范性因果力估计方面的充分性。作者报告称，对反事实探测问题的判断不符合因果力，而且它们强烈依赖于探测问题的措辞以及共变信息的呈现方式。这些数据可以由因果判断的另一种模型——证据整合规则——简洁地解释。
