Burtsev Mikhail, Turchin Peter
Department of Non-linear Dynamics, Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics of RAS, Moscow 125047, Russia.
Nature. 2006 Apr 20;440(7087):1041-4. doi: 10.1038/nature04470.
One of the greatest challenges in the modern biological and social sciences is to understand the evolution of cooperative behaviour. General outlines of the answer to this puzzle are currently emerging as a result of developments in the theories of kin selection, reciprocity, multilevel selection and cultural group selection. The main conceptual tool used in probing the logical coherence of proposed explanations has been game theory, including both analytical models and agent-based simulations. The game-theoretic approach yields clear-cut results but assumes, as a rule, a simple structure of payoffs and a small set of possible strategies. Here we propose a more stringent test of the theory by developing a computer model with a considerably extended spectrum of possible strategies. In our model, agents are endowed with a limited set of receptors, a set of elementary actions and a neural net in between. Behavioural strategies are not predetermined; instead, the process of evolution constructs and reconstructs them from elementary actions. Two new strategies of cooperative attack and defence emerge in simulations, as well as the well-known dove, hawk and bourgeois strategies. Our results indicate that cooperative strategies can evolve even under such minimalist assumptions, provided that agents are capable of perceiving heritable external markers of other agents.
现代生物学和社会科学中最大的挑战之一是理解合作行为的进化。由于亲属选择、互惠、多层次选择和文化群体选择理论的发展，这个谜题的大致答案目前正在浮现。用于探究所提出解释的逻辑连贯性的主要概念工具是博弈论，包括分析模型和基于主体的模拟。博弈论方法产生明确的结果，但通常假设收益结构简单且可能的策略集较少。在这里，我们通过开发一个具有相当广泛可能策略范围的计算机模型，对该理论提出更严格的检验。在我们的模型中，主体被赋予一组有限的感受器、一组基本动作以及介于两者之间的神经网络。行为策略不是预先确定的；相反，进化过程从基本动作构建并重构它们。在模拟中出现了两种新的合作攻击和防御策略，以及著名的鸽派、鹰派和资产阶级策略。我们的结果表明，只要主体能够感知其他主体可遗传的外部标记，即使在这种极简主义假设下，合作策略也能够进化。
