A mixed strategy model for the emergence and intensification of social learning in a periodically changing natural environment.

Based on a population genetic model of mixed strategies determined by alleles of small effect, we derive conditions for the evolution of social learning in an infinite-state environment that changes periodically over time. Each mixed strategy is defined by the probabilities that an organism will commit itself to individual learning, social learning, or innate behavior. We identify the convergent stable strategies (CSS) by a numerical adaptive dynamics method and then check the evolutionary stability (ESS) of these strategies. A strategy that is simultaneously a CSS and an ESS is called an attractive ESS (AESS). For certain parameter sets, a bifurcation diagram shows that the pure individual learning strategy is the unique AESS for short periods of environmental change, a mixed learning strategy is the unique AESS for intermediate periods, and a mixed learning strategy (with a relatively large social learning component) and the pure innate strategy are both AESS's for long periods. This result entails that, once social learning emerges during a transient era of intermediate environmental periodicity, a subsequent elongation of the period may result in the intensification of social learning, rather than a return to innate behavior.