Marcus Gary F
Department of Psychology, New York University, NY, USA.
Cognition. 2006 Sep;101(2):443-65. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2006.04.009. Epub 2006 Jun 5.
Against a background of recent progress in developmental neuroscience, some of which has been taken as challenging to the modularity hypothesis of , this article contrasts two competing conceptions of modularity: sui generis modularity, according to which modules are treated as independent neurocognitive entities that owe nothing to one another, and descent-with-modification modularity, according to which current cognitive modules are understood to be shaped by evolutionary changes from ancestral cognitive modules. I argue that sui generis modularity is incompatible with a range of data, from the co-occurrence of deficits to the patterns of activation in neuroimaging studies, but that same range of data is compatible with descent-with-modification modularity. Furthermore, I argue that the latter conception of modularity may have important implications for the practice and conception of fields such as developmental disorders and linguistics.
在发育神经科学近期取得进展的背景下,其中一些进展被认为对[具体内容未提及的模块化假设]提出了挑战,本文对比了两种相互竞争的模块化概念:自成一类的模块化,即模块被视为相互独立、互不依赖的神经认知实体;以及随修改而传承的模块化,即当前的认知模块被理解为由祖先认知模块的进化变化所塑造。我认为,自成一类的模块化与一系列数据不相符,从缺陷的共现到神经影像学研究中的激活模式,但同样的数据范围与随修改而传承的模块化是相符的。此外,我认为后一种模块化概念可能对发育障碍和语言学等领域的实践和概念具有重要意义。