Stanford University.
J Appl Behav Anal. 1980 Winter;13(4):561-70. doi: 10.1901/jaba.1980.13-561.
The effect of fines for failure to conserve water during the California drought of 1976 to 1978 was evaluated in a retrospectively arranged multiple-baseline design across three San Francisco Bay area cities. The data indicated that, on a community level, significant savings of water occurred regardless of whether fines were introduced or not. However, on an individual level, fines appeared to have an effect on private, as opposed to commercial or industrial, consumers who had received at least one fine. The limitations imposed on these conclusions by the quasi-experimental nature of the design were highlighted. Possible reasons for water conservation in the absence of fines were discussed within the framework of stimulus control. It was suggested that an area for future research should be the delineation of stimulus parameters involved in producing behavior change in entire communities.
1976 年至 1978 年加利福尼亚干旱期间，未能节约用水的罚款所产生的影响，在旧金山湾区三个城市的回顾性多基线设计中进行了评估。数据表明，无论是否引入罚款，从社区层面来看，用水量都有显著节省。然而，在个人层面上，罚款似乎对收到至少一张罚款单的私人而非商业或工业消费者产生了影响。设计的准实验性质对这些结论的限制被强调。在刺激控制框架内讨论了在没有罚款的情况下节约用水的可能原因。有人建议，未来的研究领域应该是确定在整个社区中产生行为变化所涉及的刺激参数。
