DeSteno David, Bartlett Monica Y, Salovey Peter
Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, USA.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 2006 Sep;91(3):519-23. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.91.3.519.
This article responds to a critique by H. C. Barrett, D. A. Frederick, M. G. Haselton, and R. Kurzban, wherein it is argued that manipulations of cognitive constraints cannot be used to test general evolutionary hypotheses regarding the architecture of mind. In making this argument, Barrett et al. focus on what they believe to be faulty logic in D. DeSteno, M. Y. Bartlett, J. Braverman, and P. Salovey's use of such techniques to examine proposed sex differences in jealousy. In presenting their argument, however, Barrett et al. appear to disregard central findings presented in DeSteno et al. (2002) and, in so doing, fail to grasp the interrelations among findings that might readily address their concerns. Here, the authors present arguments for why and when manipulations of cognitive resources may prove useful in investigating evolved psychological mechanisms and, in so doing, situate their use within the ongoing debate concerning evolved sex differences in jealousy.
本文回应了H. C. 巴雷特、D. A. 弗雷德里克、M. G. 哈瑟尔顿和R. 库尔兹班的一篇评论文章，其中他们认为，对认知限制的操控不能用于检验关于心理结构的一般进化假说。在提出这一论点时，巴雷特等人关注的是他们认为D. 德斯特诺、M. Y. 巴特利特、J. 布雷弗曼和P. 萨洛维在使用此类技术研究嫉妒心理中提出的性别差异时存在的逻辑错误。然而，在阐述他们的论点时，巴雷特等人似乎忽略了德斯特诺等人（2002年）提出的核心研究结果，并且这样做未能理解这些研究结果之间的相互关系，而这些关系可能很容易解决他们的担忧。在此，作者阐述了为何以及何时对认知资源的操控在研究进化心理机制时可能有用，并在此过程中，将其运用置于关于嫉妒心理中进化出的性别差异的持续争论之中。
