Evans Jonathan St B T
Centre for Thinking and Language, School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Plymouth PL4 8AA, England.
Psychon Bull Rev. 2006 Jun;13(3):378-95. doi: 10.3758/bf03193858.
An extensively revised heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning is presented incorporating three principles of hypothetical thinking. The theory assumes that reasoning and judgment are facilitated by the formation of epistemic mental models that are generated one at a time (singularity principle) by preconscious heuristic processes that contextualize problems in such a way as to maximize relevance to current goals (relevance principle). Analytic processes evaluate these models but tend to accept them unless there is good reason to reject them (satisficing principle). At a minimum, analytic processing of models is required so as to generate inferences or judgments relevant to the task instructions, but more active intervention may result in modification or replacement of default models generated by the heuristic system. Evidence for this theory is provided by a review of a wide range of literature on thinking and reasoning.
本文提出了一种经过广泛修订的启发式 - 分析式推理理论,该理论纳入了假设性思维的三个原则。该理论认为,推理和判断是通过认知心理模型的形成来促进的,这些模型由前意识启发式过程一次生成一个(单一性原则),这些过程以一种使问题与当前目标相关性最大化的方式将问题情境化(相关性原则)。分析过程对这些模型进行评估,但倾向于接受它们,除非有充分理由拒绝它们(满意原则)。至少,需要对模型进行分析处理,以便生成与任务指令相关的推理或判断,但更积极的干预可能会导致启发式系统生成的默认模型被修改或替换。通过对广泛的关于思维和推理的文献综述,为该理论提供了证据。