Hughes Jonathan
Keele University, Staffordshire, United Kingdom.
J Med Philos. 2006 Oct;31(5):447-64. doi: 10.1080/03605310600912642.
The precautionary principle has its origins in debates about environmental policy, but is increasingly invoked in bioethical contexts. John Harris and Søren Holm argue that the principle should be rejected as incoherent, irrational, and representing a fundamental threat to scientific advance and technological progress. This article argues that while there are problems with standard formulations of the principle, Harris and Holm's rejection of all its forms is mistaken. In particular, they focus on strong versions of the principle and fail to recognize that weaker forms, which may escape their criticisms, are both possible and advocated in the literature.
预防原则起源于关于环境政策的辩论，但如今在生物伦理背景下的援引日益增多。约翰·哈里斯和索伦·霍尔姆认为，该原则应被摒弃，因其不连贯、不合理，且对科学进步和技术发展构成根本威胁。本文认为，虽然该原则的标准表述存在问题，但哈里斯和霍尔姆对其所有形式的拒斥是错误的。具体而言，他们关注的是该原则的强版本，却未认识到较弱版本既可能存在，也在文献中得到倡导，而这些较弱版本可能避开他们的批评。
