Civin M, Lombardi K L
Psychoanal Rev. 1990 Winter;77(4):573-85.
Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) have suggested that the drive/structure model and the relational/structure model are mutually exclusive models of psychic life. We regard their contribution as an invaluable one, which makes explicit the fundamental divergences in psychoanalytic theory. We have examined a derivative tendency in the field, for drive and relational theorists alike, to present psychic life as a dichotomy between inner experience and outer experience. We see a tendency to equate the drive model with unconscious motivation, and to the primacy of internal experience. There seems to be an equivalent tendency to equate the relational model with conscious perception and motivation, and to the primacy of external experience. We are advocating, for drive and relational theorists alike, greater focus on the process of intermediation between internal and external experience in the psychic life of the individual. Within the context of the drive model, precedent for such a focus is found in Freud's conception of the preconscious, an essential third dimension whose function was to mediate between the conscious and the unconscious. Within the context of the relational model, Winnicott's notion of potential space serves as a bridge between interior experience and external reality in the life of the individual. Finally, we have argued that by constructing three-part models of psychic life, these theorists have laid the groundwork for a synthetic theory. Though for Freud the drive state is primary, and for Winnicott the relationship between the infant and its environment (mother) is primary, each theorist posits an intermediating zone that fulfills a similar function in the psychic life of the individual. Whether we choose to call that zone the preconscious or potential space, its function is to translate bidirectionally between the infinitely dimensioned realm of interior, or unconscious, experience and the time-and space-bound realm of external, or conscious, experience. By highlighting the parallel constructs, we are not claiming to have created a synthesis between the theories. Our claim is that the eventual road to synthesis appears to reside in the direction of a movement away from the dichotomy between the primacy of inner or outer experience, and toward the common meeting ground of the primacy of an intermediating function.
格林伯格和米切尔（1983）提出，驱力/结构模型和关系/结构模型是精神生活中相互排斥的模型。我们认为他们的贡献是非常宝贵的，它明确了精神分析理论中的根本分歧。我们研究了该领域的一种衍生趋势，无论是驱力理论家还是关系理论家，都倾向于将精神生活呈现为内心体验和外部体验之间的二分法。我们看到一种将驱力模型等同于无意识动机以及内部体验首要性的趋势。似乎存在一种类似的趋势，即将关系模型等同于有意识的感知和动机以及外部体验的首要性。我们主张，无论是驱力理论家还是关系理论家，都应更加关注个体精神生活中内部和外部体验之间的中介过程。在驱力模型的背景下，这种关注的先例可见于弗洛伊德的前意识概念，这是一个至关重要的第三维度，其功能是在意识和无意识之间进行调解。在关系模型的背景下，温尼科特的潜在空间概念在个体生活中充当了内部体验和外部现实之间的桥梁。最后，我们认为，通过构建精神生活的三分模型，这些理论家为一种综合理论奠定了基础。虽然对弗洛伊德来说驱力状态是首要的，对温尼科特来说婴儿与其环境（母亲）之间的关系是首要的，但每位理论家都假定了一个在个体精神生活中发挥类似功能的中介区域。无论我们选择将那个区域称为前意识还是潜在空间，其功能都是在无限维度的内部或无意识体验领域与有时间和空间限制的外部或有意识体验领域之间进行双向转换。通过强调这些平行的构建，我们并不是声称已经在这些理论之间创造了一种综合。我们的主张是，通向综合的最终道路似乎在于远离内部或外部体验首要性的二分法，朝着中介功能首要性的共同交汇点的方向发展。
