Natsoulas T
Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis 95616-8686, USA.
Conscious Cogn. 1995 Sep;4(3):300-22. doi: 10.1006/ccog.1995.1040.
As part of his rediscovery of consciousness, Searle has recently provided an interpretation of Freud's account of consciousness, including the relation of consciousness to nonconscious mental occurrences [i.e., preconscious mental occurrences and unconscious (repressed) mental occurrences]. Regrettably, Searle's interpretation is based on a single paragraph from The Unconscious and serves to eliminate Freud's general view on these matters as being "incoherent." In the present article, I rediscover Freud's account and show that Searle has deeply misunderstood him, thus converting Freud into a "mental-eye" theorist of consciousness when Freud is actually an "intrinsic" theorist. I point out that Freud's and Searle's views on consciousness are actually similar, though Searle denies the existence of nonconscious mental occurrences. My discussion of Freud's account of consciousness addresses as well (a) Freud's understanding of emotions and feelings, including what he calls "misconstrued" emotions, and repression that works to suppress the development of affect, and (b) why Freud held that emotions and feelings never occur except consciously. I hope that my present contribution will be part of an intensive discussion that will proceed among psychologists of consciousness in a conscious and deliberate joint effort to develop the theory of consciousness.
作为其对意识重新探索的一部分，塞尔最近对弗洛伊德关于意识的论述进行了阐释，包括意识与非意识心理现象的关系[即前意识心理现象和无意识（被压抑的）心理现象]。遗憾的是，塞尔的阐释仅基于《无意识》中的一段话，且试图将弗洛伊德在这些问题上的总体观点视为“不连贯的”而予以摒弃。在本文中，我重新审视了弗洛伊德的论述，并表明塞尔对他存在严重误解，从而将弗洛伊德转变为一位意识的“心眼”理论家，而实际上弗洛伊德是一位“内在”理论家。我指出，尽管塞尔否认非意识心理现象的存在，但弗洛伊德和塞尔在意识问题上的观点实际上是相似的。我对弗洛伊德意识论述的讨论还涉及：（a）弗洛伊德对情感和感觉的理解，包括他所谓的“误解的”情感，以及抑制情感发展的压抑；（b）弗洛伊德为何认为情感和感觉永远只在有意识时才会出现。我希望我目前的贡献将成为意识心理学家之间深入讨论的一部分，他们将有意识且审慎地共同努力来发展意识理论。
