Cushman Fiery, Young Liane, Hauser Marc
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, USA.
Psychol Sci. 2006 Dec;17(12):1082-9. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01834.x.
Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second. This finding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justification, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas others are not.
道德判断是通过直觉还是有意识的推理完成的？要回答这个问题需要详细阐述相关的道德原则。我们研究了指导道德判断的三条原则：（a）行为造成的伤害比不作为造成的伤害更严重；（b）作为达到目的手段而故意造成的伤害比作为目的的附带后果而预见的伤害更严重；（c）涉及与受害者身体接触的伤害比不涉及身体接触的伤害更严重。在探究这些原则是否被用来解释道德判断时，我们发现，受试者在做出解释时通常会诉诸第一和第三条原则，而不会诉诸第二条原则。这一发现对道德心理学的方法和理论具有重要意义：判断中使用的道德原则必须与解释中阐述的原则进行直接比较，这样做表明有些道德原则可用于有意识的推理，而有些则不然。
