Rankin D J
Laboratory of Ecological and Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Biological and Environmental Science, University of Helsinki, Finland.
J Evol Biol. 2007 Jan;20(1):173-80. doi: 10.1111/j.1420-9101.2006.01211.x.
Competition and conflict among individuals can favour exploitative strategies that undermine the common good. Theory suggests that this can lead to a tragedy of the commons and ultimately population extinction, a phenomenon known as evolutionary suicide. Here, I present a model of the evolutionary tragedy of the commons that explicitly considers the population dynamics where individuals invest in individually costly competitive traits. In the simplest form, this supports the notion that selection for high levels of conflict can cause evolutionary suicide. However, as competition comes with survival and fecundity costs, a feedback between the investment in competition and population density can act to reduce the level of conflict and prevent the population from going extinct. This suggests that the interaction between population ecology and the evolution of competition and conflict among individuals may be an important mechanism in resolving the level of competition and conflict among individuals.
个体之间的竞争与冲突可能会助长破坏共同利益的剥削策略。理论表明，这可能导致公地悲剧并最终导致种群灭绝，这种现象被称为进化自杀。在此，我提出了一个公地进化悲剧模型，该模型明确考虑了个体投资于个体成本高昂的竞争性状时的种群动态。以最简单的形式，这支持了高水平冲突的选择会导致进化自杀的观点。然而，由于竞争伴随着生存和繁殖成本，竞争投资与种群密度之间的反馈可以起到降低冲突水平并防止种群灭绝的作用。这表明种群生态学与个体间竞争和冲突的进化之间的相互作用可能是解决个体间竞争和冲突水平的重要机制。
