De Cremer David
Tilburg University, The Netherlands.
Scand J Psychol. 2007 Feb;48(1):51-9. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9450.2007.00569.x.
The present research examined the moderating effect of the level of threshold on people's preferences for different leader types in step-level public good dilemmas. It was assumed that the primary focus of people in step-level public good dilemmas is to make sure that the group surpasses the threshold. Consequently, when the level of threshold is difficult to reach people are expected to provide more support for and cooperate with a leader that monitors and controls the contributions made toward the public good. However, if the threshold is easy to surpass people will focus more on whether the obtained public good or bonus will be distributed according to agreements, suggesting that people will provide more support to and cooperate with a leader that monitors and controls the distribution of the bonus. These predictions were confirmed across two experiments using a step-level public good paradigm with a dichotomous (Study 1) and a continuous (Study 2) contribution choice. Moreover, the results also revealed that perceptions of trust accounted, in part, for the effect of level of threshold on people's leadership preferences.
本研究考察了在阶梯式公共物品困境中,阈值水平对人们对不同领导类型偏好的调节作用。研究假设,在阶梯式公共物品困境中,人们的主要关注点是确保群体超过阈值。因此,当阈值水平难以达到时,预计人们会更多地支持并与监督和控制对公共物品贡献的领导者合作。然而,如果阈值很容易超过,人们将更多地关注所获得的公共物品或奖金是否会按照协议进行分配,这表明人们会更多地支持并与监督和控制奖金分配的领导者合作。通过两个实验,使用具有二分法(研究1)和连续法(研究2)贡献选择的阶梯式公共物品范式,这些预测得到了证实。此外,结果还表明,信任感知部分解释了阈值水平对人们领导偏好的影响。