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集体过度使用后的愤怒和报复:责备和环境不确定性在社会困境中的作用。

Anger and retribution after collective overuse: the role of blaming and environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas.

机构信息

Department of Social and OrganizationalPsychology, Leiden University, Institute for Psychological Research, Leiden, the Netherlands.

出版信息

Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2010 Jan;36(1):59-70. doi: 10.1177/0146167209352192.

DOI:10.1177/0146167209352192
PMID:20019385
Abstract

This article investigates how group members respond to one another when collective overuse occurs. The authors argue that interpersonal reactions after overuse in a common-resource dilemma are largely determined by the environmental characteristics of the social dilemma. More specifically, under environmental certainty they expect people to show more anger to group members than under uncertainty (Study 1). Additionally, they expect stronger retributive reactions to high harvesters than to moderate harvesters, and they expect this difference to be larger under certainty than under uncertainty (Study 2 and 3). Moreover, they predict that these effects are mediated by blaming. The results of three experiments corroborate these predictions.

摘要

本文探讨了群体成员在出现集体过度使用资源的情况下如何相互回应。作者认为,在共同资源困境中过度使用资源后,人际反应在很大程度上取决于社会困境的环境特征。更具体地说,在环境确定的情况下,他们预计人们对群体成员的愤怒情绪会比在不确定的情况下更多(研究 1)。此外,他们预计对高收割者的报复性反应比对适度收割者的反应更强,并且他们预计这种差异在确定的情况下比在不确定的情况下更大(研究 2 和 3)。此外,他们预测这些影响是通过指责来调节的。三项实验的结果证实了这些预测。

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Anger and retribution after collective overuse: the role of blaming and environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas.集体过度使用后的愤怒和报复:责备和环境不确定性在社会困境中的作用。
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