Gomes Gilberto
Behav Sci Law. 2007;25(2):221-34. doi: 10.1002/bsl.754.
The free will problem is defined and three solutions are discussed: no-freedom theory, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Strict determinism is often assumed in arguing for libertarianism or no-freedom theory. It assumes that the history of the universe is fixed, but modern physics admits a certain degree of randomness in the determination of events. However, this is not enough for a compatibilist position-which is favored here-since freedom is not randomness. It is the I that chooses what to do. It is argued that the core of the free will problem is what this I is. A materialist view is favored: The I is an activity of the brain. In addition to absence of external and internal compulsion, freedom involves absence of causal sufficiency of influences acting on the I. A more elaborate compatibilist view is proposed, according to which causal determination is complete when we add events occurring in the I (of which the subject is not conscious). Contrary to what several authors have argued, the onset of the readiness potential before the decision to act is no problem here. The experience of agency is incomplete and fallible, rather than illusory. Some consequences of different views about freedom for the ascription of responsibility are discussed.
自由意志问题被定义，并讨论了三种解决方案：无自由理论、自由意志主义和兼容主义。在论证自由意志主义或无自由理论时，常常假定严格决定论。它假定宇宙的历史是固定的，但现代物理学承认在事件的决定过程中存在一定程度的随机性。然而，这对于这里所支持的兼容主义立场来说是不够的，因为自由并非随机性。是“我”选择做什么。有人认为，自由意志问题的核心在于这个“我”是什么。这里支持一种唯物主义观点：“我”是大脑的一种活动。除了没有外部和内部的强制之外，自由还涉及作用于“我”的影响不存在因果充分性。本文提出了一种更详尽的兼容主义观点，根据该观点，当我们把发生在“我”身上（主体没有意识到）的事件加进来时，因果决定就是完整的。与几位作者所主张的相反，在这里，行动决定之前准备电位的出现不是问题。行动主体的体验是不完整且易出错的，而不是虚幻的。文中还讨论了关于自由的不同观点对责任归属的一些影响。
