Faculty of Humanities, School of Philosophy and Cultural Studies, HSE University, 21/4 Staraya Basmannaya Ulitsa, Building 1, Moscow, Russian Federation.
Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 2024 Sep;58(3):916-931. doi: 10.1007/s12124-023-09816-6. Epub 2024 Jan 18.
In recent years, neurophysiological research has pushed the concept of free will towards a reductionist interpretation, largely avoiding the concept of a freely willing agent. This paper explores the ongoing debate surrounding free will, highlighting the contrasting perspectives of determinism, indeterminism (libertarianism), and compatibilism. It questions how individuals, particularly those adhering to deterministic viewpoints, can ethically navigate a world defined by causal relationships. The paper argues that reductionist approaches struggle to account for ethical responsibility and the human experience of making choices. While compatibilism offers a middle ground, asserting that actions in line with one's desires are free and thus ethically accountable, this stance is scrutinized for its potential limitations in answering questions about personal responsibility. Specifically, it is argued that compatibilism may not be the ideal framework for a neurophysiologist confronted with ethical dilemmas, thus leaving room for the re-examination of indeterminism. Through this discussion, the paper aims to contribute to a nuanced understanding of free will that incorporates both the scientific and philosophical dimensions of human decision-making.
近年来，神经生理学研究将自由意志的概念推向了一种简化论的解释，在很大程度上避免了自由意志主体的概念。本文探讨了围绕自由意志的持续争论，突出了决定论、非决定论（自由意志论）和相容论的对比观点。它质疑了个体，特别是那些坚持决定论观点的个体，如何在一个由因果关系定义的世界中进行伦理导航。本文认为，简化论方法难以解释伦理责任和人类做出选择的体验。虽然相容论提供了一个中间立场，即主张符合个人欲望的行为是自由的，因此在伦理上是可问责的，但这种立场因其在回答关于个人责任的问题方面的潜在局限性而受到审查。具体来说，有人认为，相容论对于面对伦理困境的神经生理学家来说可能不是理想的框架，因此为重新审视非决定论留出了空间。通过这次讨论，本文旨在对人类决策的科学和哲学维度进行细致的理解，从而对自由意志做出贡献。
