Blair R J R
Mood and Anxiety Disorders Program, National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health, 15K North Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892, USA.
Behav Sci Law. 2007;25(2):321-31. doi: 10.1002/bsl.750.
This article considers the notion of free will in the context of aggression and psychopathy research. The philosophical literature is very briefly considered to determine under what assumptions free will can be considered to exist. However, as the issue of free will is very difficult to address directly, the prime focus of this article is on issues raised in the philosophical debate, that may be empirically tractable and that are relevant to the understanding of psychopathy. Specifically, the following issues are considered: (1) The distinction between automatic and controlled processing; (2) Impairment related to automatic processing in individuals with psychopathy; and (3) Impairment related to controlled behavior in individuals with psychopathy. It is concluded that, while there is not a direct mapping of the automatic versus controlled processing dichotomy on to the reactive versus instrumental aggression dichotomy, some overlap can be considered. As such, it is possible to consider that certain episodes of reactive aggression might be considered to occur in the absence of free will. However, instrumental aggression, at least from a compatibilist perspective, must involve free will.
本文在攻击行为和精神病态研究的背景下探讨自由意志的概念。文章简要回顾了哲学文献,以确定在何种假设下可以认为自由意志存在。然而,由于自由意志问题很难直接解决,本文的主要重点是哲学辩论中提出的、可能在经验上易于处理且与理解精神病态相关的问题。具体而言,考虑了以下问题:(1)自动加工与控制加工之间的区别;(2)精神病态个体中与自动加工相关的损害;(3)精神病态个体中与控制行为相关的损害。结论是,虽然自动加工与控制加工的二分法与反应性攻击和工具性攻击的二分法之间没有直接对应关系,但可以认为存在一些重叠。因此,可以认为某些反应性攻击事件可能被认为是在没有自由意志的情况下发生的。然而,至少从相容论的角度来看,工具性攻击必须涉及自由意志。