Burns Kelly, Bechara Antoine
Brain and Creativity Institute and Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA.
Behav Sci Law. 2007;25(2):263-80. doi: 10.1002/bsl.751.
A thorough analysis of the question of whether we possess "free will" requires that we take into account the process of exercising that will: that is, the neural mechanisms of decision making. Much of what we know about these mechanisms indicates that decision making is greatly influenced by implicit processes that may not even reach consciousness. Moreover, there exist conditions, for example certain types of brain injury or drug addiction, in which an individual can be said to have a disorder of the will. Examples such as these demonstrate that the idea of freedom of will on which our legal system is based is not supported by the neuroscience of decision making. Using the criminal law as an example, we discuss how new discoveries in neuroscience can serve as a tool for reprioritizing our society's legal intuitions in a way that leads us to a more effective and humane system.
对我们是否拥有“自由意志”这一问题进行全面分析,需要我们考虑行使意志的过程:也就是说,决策的神经机制。我们对这些机制的了解表明,决策很大程度上受到甚至可能未达意识层面的隐性过程的影响。此外,还存在一些情况,例如某些类型的脑损伤或药物成瘾,在这些情况下,可以说个体存在意志障碍。诸如此类的例子表明,我们法律体系所基于的自由意志观念并未得到决策神经科学的支持。以刑法为例,我们讨论神经科学的新发现如何能够作为一种工具,以一种使我们走向更有效和人道体系的方式,对我们社会的法律直觉重新进行优先排序。