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世界粮食生产扩张的制度性障碍。

Institutional obstacles to expansion of world food production.

作者信息

Crosson P R

出版信息

Science. 1975 May 9;188(4188):519-24. doi: 10.1126/science.188.4188.519.

Abstract

It was argued that over the near-to-medium term-roughly to the mid-1980's-there is enough potential for growth in existing Green Revolution technology and in technical capacity of farmers that institutions affecting these two sources of increased food production probably will not be seriously constraining. The principal bottlenecks likely will be found among those institutions affecting farmers' incentives to innovate. There is impressive evidence that when other conditions for innovation are favorable the supply of marketing services, for both inputs and outputs, is quite elastic. This seems to include the supply of funds from rural saving and informal credit sources, although the evidence is less clear in this respect. The situation concerning price relations and availability of inputs appears mixed. If national income growth targets are achieved, then the growth in total demand for food in the LDC's should be fast enough to support incentive prices for farmers. This advantage could be lost, however, if governments adopt policies to suppress food prices to keep down the cost of living. The price of fertilizers is expected to fall from the high levels of 1974, the amount of the fall depending in good measure on the success of the LDC's in increasing fertilizer production. Historically, their efforts to expand capacity have been relatively inefficient. Moreover, many countries still lack adequate capacity to produce the HYV's and pesticides. Even with good progress in expanding domestic production of inputs, imports will continue to be an important source of supply. Maintenance of present high prices of petroleum products could be a major obstacle to financing these imports on the necessary scale because of the drain it would place on available foreign exchange. I conclude, on balance, that prices and availability of fertilizers, pesticides, and seeds could have important negative effects on farmers' incentives to adopt Green Revolution technology. Rigidities in water management institutions may be even more limiting, for reasons noted in the previous section. The role of existing land tenure institutions is not clear. The tentative conclusion, however, is that over the near-to-medium term the maintenance will not be a major obstacle to further spread of the Green Revolution. Over the longer term, it could become more seriously limiting. The reason is that continued expansion of food production will eventually require the invention and adoption of new technologies and a higher level of technical and managerial skill than most farmers in the LDC's now possess. To do this will require substantial investments in domestic research and extension institutions and in rural education. In countries where a small class of large landowners wield substantial political power, these investments may not occur on the necessary scale because the large farmers have their own means of acquiring the technology and little perceived interest in supporting the upgrading of the skills of small farmers. This review of institutional obstacles to expansion of food production in the LDC's must end on a tentative note. The review does suggest some observations about the process of institutional change, however. There is impressive evidence of strong latent potential in the private sector of the LDC's for mobilizing the resources and effort needed for agricultural progress when the private economic rewards for doing so are high. Under these circumstances, needed changes in the institutions required to mobilize the resources and direct the effort seem relatively easy to achieve. Institutional resistance is stronger in situations where influential interests perceive change as a threat or where there is no direct personal economic reward to change, as in the typical public institution. The latter point is particularly important because the performance of public institutions is critical. Development of new technology, the fundamental condition for continued longterm growth, is basically a public responsibility because the gains from adoption usually cannot be sufficiently captured by private institutions to justify their assuming the cost. Although private firms often have incentives to impart technical knowledge to farmers as a way of widening the market for their products, the broadening and strengthening of the institutional structures concerned with both the general and technical education of farmers is a public responsibility. This is true also of the development of large irrigation systems, both because of the scale of the needed investments and the potential for social conflict in water management. The lack of a well-defined mechanism that would link responses of public institutions to the large social payoffs to increased public investment in irrigation, new technology, and technical abilities of farmers may prove in the long run to be the most important single obstacle to adequate growth of food production in the LDC's.

摘要

有人认为,在近期至中期——大致到20世纪80年代中期——现有绿色革命技术以及农民技术能力的增长潜力足以使影响这两个粮食增产来源的机构不太可能构成严重制约。主要瓶颈可能会出现在那些影响农民创新积极性的机构之中。有令人信服的证据表明,当创新的其他条件有利时,投入和产出的营销服务供应具有相当的弹性。这似乎包括农村储蓄和非正式信贷来源的资金供应,尽管这方面的证据不太明确。投入品的价格关系和可得性情况似乎好坏参半。如果实现了国民收入增长目标,那么最不发达国家粮食总需求的增长应该足够快,足以支撑对农民的激励性价格。然而,如果政府采取压低食品价格以控制生活成本的政策,这一优势可能会丧失。预计化肥价格将从1974年的高位回落,回落幅度在很大程度上取决于最不发达国家在增加化肥产量方面的成功程度。从历史上看,它们扩大产能的努力效率相对较低。此外,许多国家仍然缺乏生产高产品种和农药的足够能力。即使在扩大国内投入品生产方面取得了良好进展,进口仍将是重要的供应来源。维持目前石油产品的高价格可能成为按必要规模为这些进口融资的主要障碍,因为这会消耗现有的外汇。总的来说,我得出的结论是,化肥、农药和种子的价格及可得性可能对农民采用绿色革命技术的积极性产生重要的负面影响。如前所述,水管理机构的僵化可能更具限制性。现有土地所有制机构的作用尚不清楚。然而,初步结论是,在近期至中期,土地所有制不会成为绿色革命进一步推广的主要障碍。从长远来看,它可能会变得更具限制性。原因是粮食生产的持续扩张最终将需要发明和采用新技术,以及比目前大多数最不发达国家农民所拥有的更高水平的技术和管理技能。要做到这一点,需要对国内研究和推广机构以及农村教育进行大量投资。在一小部分大地主拥有巨大政治权力的国家,这些投资可能无法达到必要规模,因为大农场主有自己获取技术的途径,而且几乎没有意识到支持小农场主技能提升的利益。对最不发达国家粮食生产扩张的制度障碍的这一综述必须以初步结论结束。不过,该综述确实对制度变革过程提出了一些看法。有令人信服的证据表明,当这样做的私人经济回报很高时,最不发达国家的私营部门在调动农业进步所需的资源和努力方面具有强大的潜在潜力。在这种情况下,调动资源和引导努力所需的制度变革似乎相对容易实现。在有影响力的利益集团将变革视为威胁的情况下,或者在没有直接个人经济回报的情况下,如在典型的公共机构中,制度阻力更强。后一点尤为重要,因为公共机构的绩效至关重要。新技术的开发是持续长期增长的基本条件,基本上是一项公共责任,因为采用新技术的收益通常无法被私营机构充分获取,以证明它们承担成本是合理的。尽管私营公司通常有激励向农民传授技术知识,以此扩大其产品市场,但与农民的一般教育和技术教育相关的制度结构的拓宽和加强是一项公共责任。大型灌溉系统的开发也是如此,这既是因为所需投资的规模,也是因为水管理中存在社会冲突的可能性。从长远来看,缺乏一种明确的机制将公共机构的反应与增加对灌溉、新技术和农民技术能力的公共投资所带来的巨大社会收益联系起来,可能是最不发达国家粮食产量充分增长的最重要的单一障碍。

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