Chan Sarah, Quigley Muireann
Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, University of Manchester, United Kingdom.
Bioethics. 2007 Oct;21(8):439-48. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00581.x.
Recent ethical and legal challenges have arisen concerning the rights of individuals over their IVF embryos, leading to questions about how, when the wishes of parents regarding their embryos conflict, such situations ought to be resolved. A notion commonly invoked in relation to frozen embryo disputes is that of reproductive rights: a right to have (or not to have) children. This has sometimes been interpreted to mean a right to have, or not to have, one's own genetic children. But can such rights legitimately be asserted to give rise to claims over embryos? We examine the question of property in genetic material as applied to gametes and embryos, and whether rights over genetic information extend to grant control over IVF embryos. In particular we consider the purported right not to have one's own genetically related children from a property-based perspective. We argue that even if we concede that such (property) rights do exist, those rights become limited in scope and application upon engaging in reproduction. We want to show that once an IVF embryo is created for the purpose of reproduction, any right not to have genetically-related children that may be based in property rights over genetic information is ceded. There is thus no right to prevent one's IVF embryos from being brought to birth on the basis of a right to avoid having one's own genetic children. Although there may be reproductive rights over gametes and embryos, these are not grounded in genetic information.
近期，围绕个人对其体外受精胚胎所享有的权利，出现了一些伦理和法律方面的挑战，这引发了诸多问题，比如当父母对其胚胎的意愿发生冲突时，此类情况应如何解决。在冷冻胚胎纠纷中，常被提及的一个概念是生殖权利：即生育（或不生育）子女的权利。这有时被解释为拥有或不拥有自己亲生孩子的权利。但这种权利能否合理地被主张以产生对胚胎的诉求呢？我们探讨将遗传物质视为财产应用于配子和胚胎的问题，以及对遗传信息的权利是否延伸至赋予对体外受精胚胎的控制权。特别是，我们从基于财产的角度考虑所谓不生育自己亲生孩子的权利。我们认为，即便我们承认此类（财产）权利确实存在，但一旦参与生殖活动，这些权利在范围和应用上就会受到限制。我们想表明，一旦为了生殖目的创造了体外受精胚胎，任何基于对遗传信息的财产权而产生的不生育亲生孩子的权利都将让渡。因此，不存在基于避免生育自己亲生孩子的权利而阻止自己的体外受精胚胎出生的权利。尽管对配子和胚胎可能存在生殖权利，但这些权利并非基于遗传信息。
