Dieterle J M
Eastern Michigan University, Department of History and Philosophy, Ypsilanti, MI 48197, USA.
Bioethics. 2007 Mar;21(3):127-39. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00536.x.
In this paper, I examine the argumens agains physician assisted suicide (PAS). Many of these arguments are consequentialist. Consequentialist arguments rely on empirical claims about the future and thus their strength depends on how likely it is that the predictions will be realized. I discuss these predictions against the backdrop of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act and the practice of PAS in the Netherlands. I then turn to a specific consequentialist argument against PAS - Susan M. Wolfs feminist critique of the practice. Finally, I examine the two most prominent deontological arguments against PAS. Ultimately, I conclude that no anti-PAS argument has merit. Although I do not provide positive arguments for PAS, if none of the arguments against it are strong, we have no reason not to legalize it.
在本文中，我审视了反对医生协助自杀（PAS）的论据。其中许多论据是结果主义的。结果主义论据依赖于对未来的实证主张，因此其说服力取决于这些预测实现的可能性。我在俄勒冈州《尊严死亡法案》以及荷兰医生协助自杀实践的背景下讨论这些预测。然后我转向一个反对医生协助自杀的具体结果主义论据——苏珊·M·沃尔夫对该实践的女性主义批判。最后，我审视了两个最突出的反对医生协助自杀的道义论论据。最终，我得出结论，没有任何反对医生协助自杀的论据站得住脚。虽然我没有为医生协助自杀提供支持性论据，但如果没有反对它的有力论据，我们就没有理由不让其合法化。
