Bartolini Fabio, Gallerani Vittorio, Raggi Meri, Viaggi Davide
Dipartimento di Economia e Ingegneria Agrarie, University of Bologna, Viale Fanin, 50, 40127, Bologna, Italy.
Environ Manage. 2007 Oct;40(4):567-77. doi: 10.1007/s00267-005-0136-z. Epub 2007 Aug 10.
The performance of different policy design strategies is a key issue in evaluating programmes for water quality improvement under the Water Framework Directive (60/2000). This issue is emphasised by information asymmetries between regulator and agents. Using an economic model under asymmetric information, the aim of this paper is to compare the cost-effectiveness of selected methods of designing payments to farmers in order to reduce nitrogen pollution in agriculture. A principal-agent model is used, based on profit functions generated through farm-level linear programming. This allows a comparison of flat rate payments and a menu of contracts developed through mechanism design. The model is tested in an area of Emilia Romagna (Italy) in two policy contexts: Agenda 2000 and the 2003 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform. The results show that different policy design options lead to differences in policy costs as great as 200-400%, with clear advantages for the menu of contracts. However, different policy scenarios may strongly affect such differences. Hence, the paper calls for greater attention to the interplay between CAP scenarios and water quality measures.
在评估《水框架指令》（60/2000）下的水质改善计划时，不同政策设计策略的成效是一个关键问题。监管机构与各主体之间的信息不对称突出了这一问题。本文利用一个非对称信息下的经济模型，旨在比较为减少农业氮污染而设计的向农民付款的选定方法的成本效益。基于农场层面线性规划生成的利润函数，使用了一个委托代理模型。这使得能够比较统一费率付款与通过机制设计制定的一系列合同。该模型在意大利艾米利亚 - 罗马涅地区的两个政策背景下进行了测试：2000年议程和2003年共同农业政策（CAP）改革。结果表明，不同的政策设计选项会导致政策成本相差200 - 400%，一系列合同具有明显优势。然而，不同的政策情景可能会强烈影响这种差异。因此，本文呼吁更加关注共同农业政策情景与水质措施之间的相互作用。
