Boden Leslie I, Ozonoff David
Department of Environmental Health, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02118, USA.
Environ Health Perspect. 2008 Jan;116(1):117-22. doi: 10.1289/ehp.9987.
In a 1994 Ninth Circuit decision on the remand of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Judge Alex Kosinski wrote that science done for the purpose of litigation should be subject to more stringent standards of admissibility than other science.
We analyze this proposition by considering litigation-generated science as a subset of science involving conflict of interest.
Judge Kosinski's formulation suggests there may be reasons to treat science involving conflict of interest differently but raises questions about whether litigation-generated science should be singled out. In particular we discuss the similar problems raised by strategically motivated science done in anticipation of possible future litigation or otherwise designed to benefit the sponsor and ask what special treatment, if any, should be given to science undertaken to support existing or potential future litigation.
The problems with litigation-generated science are not special. On the contrary, they are very general and apply to much or most science that is relevant and reliable in the courtroom setting.
在1994年第九巡回上诉法院关于发回重审“达伯特诉美锐尔·道制药公司案”的一项裁决中,亚历克斯·科辛斯基法官写道,为诉讼目的而开展的科学研究应遵循比其他科学更为严格的可采性标准。
我们通过将诉讼产生的科学视为涉及利益冲突的科学的一个子集来分析这一观点。
科辛斯基法官的表述表明,可能有理由对涉及利益冲突的科学区别对待,但这引发了一个问题,即是否应将诉讼产生的科学单独挑出来。特别是,我们讨论了因预期未来可能发生诉讼而进行的、或旨在使资助方受益的具有战略动机的科学所引发的类似问题,并探讨对于为支持现有或潜在未来诉讼而开展的科学应给予何种特殊待遇(如果有的话)。
诉讼产生的科学所存在的问题并非特殊问题。相反,这些问题非常普遍,适用于在法庭环境中相关且可靠的许多或大多数科学研究。